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The appointment of former President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso as an
adviser at Goldman Sachs has generated criticism in recent weeks, with some observers arguing
that it represents a clear conflict of interest. Luís de Sousa writes that Barroso’s appointment
highlights the need for more effective conflict of interest standards and clearance procedures for
Commissioners, and that failure to establish these standards could undermine public confidence in
the EU’s institutions.
Business interests are key to European integration. Without them, there would have been no Single
European Act, Schengen treaty or Eurozone. The Founding Father of the European project, Jean Monnet, was
himself a member of the early 20th century class of industrial business elites and following his resignation as Vice
Secretary General of the League of Nations, he worked as an international financial consultant in Washington.
This being said, the experience, knowledge and networks Monnet acquired in the private sector were instrumental to
his role as a European leader and not the other way around. There was a clear dividing line between the community
interest and any legitimate business interest. But today, this distinction has become blurred and high profile cases
such as the appointment of former Commission President José Manuel Barroso as an adviser at Goldman Sachs
have generated public concern.
Barroso and conflicts of interest
There is a growing fear that EU decision-making and
regulatory processes may become captured by large
corporate interests through revolving door mechanisms.
A major source of concern stems from individuals who
make a short passage through an international financial
consulting firm or investment bank prior to taking office
as a Commissioner or another relevant position in the
EU institutions. Similarly, the hiring of formerly leading
EU officials as non-executive advisers by private firms
is capable of causing considerable reputational damage
to the European project.
These cases are public and widely discussed in the
media, yet no action has yet been taken whether the
issue is senior advisers of the Commission’s Legal
Service associated to major law firms; current
Commissioners linked to banks and lobbying firms; or
former Commissioners taking jobs in companies that
have benefited from EU regulatory interventions.
In the first EU Anti-Corruption Report, the European Commission warned that although the ‘mobility of labour
between the public and private sectors is essential for the functioning of a modern society and can bring major
benefits to both the public and the private sector, such practice needs to be regulated and supervised, because it
implies a potential risk that former public officials disclose information from their previous functions that should not
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be disclosed and that former private sector staff take up public functions that result in conflicts of interest with regard
to their former employer’. Of course, this is easier said than done and simply articulating ethical standards to
Member States is not the same as governing the EU’s institutions.
The regulation and supervision of real, potential and apparent conflicts of interest in the EU’s institutional triangle is
precarious. Article 245 of TFEU states that members of the Commission, during and after their terms in office, ‘will
respect the obligations arising therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as
regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits”. Barroso’s
appointment as adviser and non-executive chairman of Goldman Sachs International, is a clear demonstration that
this treaty provision is an empty shell. It illustrates that the current conflict of interest clearance guidelines and
procedures set under the Code of Conduct for Commissioners are insufficient to protect the EU’s financial interests
and reputation, and are being applied in an arbitrary and opaque manner.
While Peter Sutherland saw the prospect of becoming President of the European Commission rejected by President
Chirac, who was vehemently opposed to the idea of having a former Chairman of Goldman Sachs International
(GSI) leading the EU’s executive body; Barroso’s dual appointment as non-executive chairman of GSI and adviser
to Goldman Sachs, following the eighteen-month cooling-off period, was accepted without restrictions. In short, the
reasons for blocking Sutherland’s pretentions ex-ante do not seem applicable to Barroso ex-post.
Flawed rules and procedures
The EU Office of Transparency International has previously exposed the loopholes and inconsistencies of the Code
of Conduct for Commissioners in its report on the EU Integrity System.
They highlighted first, that the duty to inform the European Commission about future post-employment occupations
is not strictly enforced. Second, that the ad-hoc ethical committee which has been set up ‘to assess whether the
planned occupation is compatible with Commissioners’ obligations’ and to ‘assist the Commission President in the
interpretation of the code of conduct’, is organised and operated in a ‘shadowy’ manner. Third, that there is no clear
definition of a conflict of interest for a Commissioner and that ‘the broad scope of the Treaty provision to act with
‘integrity and discretion’ both in and after service, leaves a large margin for interpretation for the Committee and
Commission President to assess whether an individual has failed in this obligation’. Finally, they noted that any
deliberations taken by the ad-hoc committee on this matter are confidential.
But Barroso’s new appointments are not just an aberration in terms of conflict of interest management; it is much
more than that. It is also part of a coherent strategy put in place by investment banks like Goldman Sachs to foster a
set of shared goals among policy-makers on regulation and macro-economic management, not only by influencing
the decision-making and agenda setting processes, but also by shaping the preferences of EU leaders.
This can have a more lasting institutional effect than simply lobbying over individual decisions. It is a strategy that
the journalist Stephen Foley, for instance, describes as aiming ‘to create such a deep exchange of people and ideas
and money that it is impossible to tell the difference between the public interest and the Goldman Sachs interest’.
This is not just politics as usual, but the decay of politics in the face of big business interests, and what is good for an
investment bank is not necessarily good for the European taxpayer.
It is therefore crucial to set clear conflict of interest standards and clearance procedures for Commissioners. The
European Commission has far-reaching regulatory powers: it can request information from companies to assess the
market situation; it can investigate alleged competition breaches; and it can impose sanctions on market agents,
including banking and financial operators. In short, Commission decisions in this field affect the structure and
operation of the common market as well as the Eurozone.
Its monopoly on legislative initiative is particularly worrying regarding the Commission’s policy responses to the
Eurozone crisis. The EU institutions, and the Commission in particular, cannot afford further reputational damage. A
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more coherent and consistent approach to conflict of interest management is urgently needed to ensure that the
institutions remain free of corruption and continue to function in the interests of the public.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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